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Abstract
”First order precaution” directly affects the probability of an accident, such as
judging the speed of a car and stepping on the brakes. Intentions are not always realized,
so first order precaution is a draw from a probability distribution. Drawing an
uncharacteristically low value is a “lapse.” “Second order precaution” reduces the
probability of a lapse. Examples include concentration when driving and preparation
before performing a medical operation. The prevailing tort rule holds the injurer liable for
harm caused by unreasonable first order precaution, regardless of second order
precaution. Unlike the standard model, our model allows injurers to make second order
precaution observable at a cost. Modifying the prevailing tort rule to allow a defense of
second order reasonableness will cause injurers to satisfy the legal standard and make this
fact observable. Three distinct advantages follow. First, the courts can set the legal
standard to induce socially efficient second order behavior. Second, this defense reduces
the burden of liability on the underlying activity, which is especially desirable to
encourage activities that benefit others, such as practicing medicine. Third, this defense
reduces the attraction of actors to activities and forms of precaution that decrease the
probability of a lapse and increase the overall risk of an accident.
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Liability for Lapses:
First or Second Order Negligence?
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat*

Introduction
When making a decision and executing it, harm can result from misjudged
distances, under-estimated probabilities, unforeseen consequences, quavering hands, slips
of the tongue, clumsy feet, or an eye’s blink. Given the possibility of lapses, actors
cannot simply choose a specific level of precaution. Instead, they draw their precaution
from a probability distribution. Here is an example.

Example 1: Driver’s Lapse. A motorist sets out on the long, straight drive
from San Francisco to Los Angeles on Route 5. The speed limit is 70 miles per
hour which is also the reasonable speed. The car lacks a mechanical device to
maintain constant speed (“cruise control”). The driver aims for 65 miles per
hour. Not being a machine, the driver cannot possibly go 65 all the time. The
driver makes reasonable effort to maintain constant speed, but occasional
lapses in attention cause the driver to exceed or fall short of 65. Near the end of
the trip, the driver has an accident while going 73. He would have avoided the
accident if he had been going 70 or less.
In statistical terms, the driver in Example 1 draws his speed from a probability
distribution with high density around 65 and low density above 70. The driver lapses
when he unintentionally draws an uncharacteristically high speed from the probability
distribution.
We use the term “first order precaution” to refer to acts that directly affect the
*
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probability of an accident, such as driving speed. First order precaution that falls short of
a community standard of care constitutes negligence in common law. The possibility of a
lapse makes negligence and liability probabilistic. Under the prevailing tort rule, the
driver in Example 1 was negligent at the time of the accident, and his negligence caused
the accident, so he is liable for the resulting harm.
While the driver in the example cannot choose an exact speed, he can affect the
probability of lapsing. After beginning his journey, the probability of lapsing depends on
how often the driver checks the speedometer, glances in the rear-view mirror, observes
the gap between his car and the car in front of him, and makes a rest stop or drinks
coffee. Even before the journey begins, the driver can take driving lessons, practice going
a constant speed, and get a good sleep the night before the journey. The driver can also
choose his target speed, which affects the consequences of a lapse. Thus lapsing has less
serious consequences when the target is 65 than when it is 70. We refer to such acts that
affect the probability distribution over first order precaution or the seriousness of its
consequences as “second order precaution.” In liability law, second order precaution
often takes the form of intentions, preparations, and concentration. In our terminology
“second order negligence” is a failure to take reasonable second order precaution.
Under prevailing law, the injurer is liable for the harm caused by negligence of
any order.1 The prevailing tort rule holds the injurer liable for harm caused by
unreasonable first order precaution, regardless of second order precaution. Prevailing tort
law does not allow a defense of higher order reasonableness.
Example 1 concerns a lapse while executing a decision. Another kind of lapse
occurs while making a decision. Deciding what to do requires weighing the alternatives.
Failing to consider alternatives, or giving the wrong weight to them, can cause an
uncharacteristically bad decision. Tort law sometimes treats such a lapse in judgment
1

Under prevailing law, the plaintiff who cannot prove first order negligence may be able to recover by
proving that second order negligence caused his harm. For example, assume that a driver swerves into the
opposing lane and hits another car. If the driver swerved to avoid hitting a child, swerving may not have
been negligent. First order behavior is reasonable. However, the plaintiff may be able to prove that the
driver failed to stop because he did not maintain his brakes in good order. Second order behavior is
unreasonable.
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differently from a lapse in execution. A lapse in execution often triggers liability, as in
Example 1. In contrast, a lapse in judgment often does not trigger liability, as this
example illustrates:
Example 2: Doctor's Lapse in Judgment. A doctor has performed a given
operation successfully many times. Before a particular operation, the doctor
carefully examines the patient and prepares the operating room. During the
operation, the patient’s condition unexpectedly deteriorates and the doctor must
immediately make a critical decision. The doctor makes the wrong decision and
the patient dies. The right decision would have saved the patient's life.
Courts are reluctant in practice to "second guess" the judgment of a doctor, accountant,
lawyers, or other certified expert.2
In Example 2, the doctor's decision while operating is first order behavior, and the
doctor’s preparation for the operation is second order behavior. An expert who
reasonably prepares for a decision, but nevertheless makes the wrong decision,
sometimes escapes liability for harm that the right decision would have avoided. Thus
courts sometimes allow a defense of second order reasonableness for a bad first order
decision. Pockets of the law recognize a defense of second order reasonableness, and, as
we will show, these pockets more often concern lapses in decisions than lapses in
executions.
Lapses cause a high proportion of accidents, yet probabilistic precaution is undertheorized in liability law. This paper develops a theory of lapses based on the difference
between first and second order behavior. We model first order precaution as a draw from
a probability distribution, not an exact choice. We model second order precaution as
behavior that changes the probability distribution over first order precaution, such as
concentration when driving and preparation for an operation. Second order precaution
reduces the probability of drawing a low level of first order precaution.
Our focus is on the question of allowing or disallowing a second order
reasonableness defense for lapses. Under prevailing tort law, the injurer is liable for harm
caused by unreasonable first order precaution, and the law does not allow a defense of
second order reasonableness. Unlike the standard model, we assume that courts cannot
2

Infra.
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observe essential elements of second order precaution unless the injurer reveals it. Thus
the court cannot obtain a GPS record unless the driver keeps it, and the same is true of
records of a doctor’s preparation for treatment.
Under certain conditions, modifying the prevailing tort rule to allow a defense of
second order reasonableness will cause injurers to satisfy this legal standard and to make
this fact observable. Three distinct advantages follow. First, the courts can set the legal
standard to induce socially efficient second order behavior. This is desirable when
uncertainty would otherwise cause precaution to be too high or too low. Second, this
defense reduces the burden of liability on the underlying activity. This is desirable to
encourage those activities that benefit others (“positive externalities”), such as practicing
medicine. Conversely, it is undesirable to encourage those activities that harm others
(“negative externalities"), such as driving. Third, this defense reduces the attraction of
actors to activities and forms of precaution that decrease the probability of a lapse and
increase the overall risk of an accident. As we will show, the defense will sometimes
prevent people from substituting more dangerous capital for less dangerous labor, or it
will prevent them from substituting actions with more lapses in judgment for actions with
more lapses in execution.3
We advocate extending the defense of second order reasonableness more
generally, when doing so captures some of these three kinds of benefits.

3

These are efficiency arguments. Liability for lapses also raises concerns from a retributive justice
perspective. Consider someone who lapses no more often than other reasonable people. If the person lapses
and harms someone, the injurer is arguably no worse morally than other reasonable people who did not
lapse. The injurer, consequently, does not deserve a sanction in the form of tort liability: his bad luck
should not count against him. Theorists who discussed the fairness (or retributive justification) of outcome
responsibility (liability for materialized harms as opposed to liability for unrealized risks) often use such
examples of lapses to illustrate the allegedly unfairness of outcome responsibility. Their arguments would
be stronger if they distinguished between first and second order negligence, and offered examples of first
order negligence without second order negligence. See e.g. Waldron (1995) (justifying outcome
responsibility on ground of retributive justice, and using an example of a lapse); Honore (1988) (justifying
outcome responsibility on fairness grounds); Schroeder (1990) (arguing from a corrective justice
perspective for liability for unrealized risks instead of materialized harms). For a discussion of the moral
luck argument from a corrective justice perspective, see Ripstein (2008) (Justifying liability for
materialized harms only); Zipursky (2008) (justifying negligence-based liability); Goldberg & Zipursky
(2007) (explaining that negligence law, while counting the injurer's bad luck against him, cannot be
defended on moral grounds only).
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The paper is organized as follows. Part I provides an account of the way
prevailing tort law deals with lapses. Part II develops our behavioral model of lapses. Part
III applies the model to situations where the activity creates negative or positive
externalities. Part IV discusses the substitution of activities and forms of precaution that
decrease the probability of a lapse and increase the overall risk of an accident. Part V
develops a second order reasonableness defense and offers various ways to implement it.
The conclusion follows.

I. Lapses under Prevailing Tort Law
A lapse from a legal standard of precaution is usually sufficient to trigger liability
for any resulting harm. In such cases, the prevailing tort rule does not usually allow a
defense of second order reasonableness. Close inspection will reveal circumstances
where courts are open to a defense of second order reasonableness.
A. Road Accidents
In most jurisdictions, drivers are liable for harm caused by their negligence, and a
driver is found negligent when his behavior is unreasonable. Examples are speeding
(Example 1), not stopping at a stop sign, reacting too slowly in dangerous situations,4
taking eyes off the road,5 not maintaining a proper lookout,6 failing to slow down when
necessary, and not keeping adequate distance from other cars. Lapses appear to be a

4

See Bobstein v. Splinter, 168 So. 2d 560. In this Guest Statute case, the defendant collided into another
vehicle which was not expected to be there. The dissent was not convinced that gross negligence, which is
a precondition for imposing liability on the driver under that statute, was proven. The judge reasoned that
"it affirmatively appears that due either to a momentary lapse of attention, or the unnatural and
unanticipated action of the driver of the other vehicle, defendant did not see such vehicle until it was too
late to stop his automobile before the collision ensued. While such action on the part of defendant may
constitute simple negligence, it falls far short of the standard required in order to allege gross negligence."
(Emphasis added).
5
See Pedersen v. Kinsley, 25 Ill. App. 3d 567. In this Guest Statute case, the defendant driver swerved off
the road and struck a lamppost. The court imposed liability on the driver, for taking her eyes off the road,
and considered it not only as mere negligence, but as willful and wanton misconduct. For similar facts and
same outcome, see also Rosbottom v. Hensley, 61 Ill.App.2d 198, 209 N.E.2d 655.
6
See Security Timber & Land Co. v. Reed, 398 So. 2d 174. In this case, a driver was found contributory
negligent for not maintaining a proper lookout, resulting in a collision with another car.
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common cause of unreasonable behavior of drivers, possibly the most common cause.7
In road accidents, a driver who lapses offers a second order defense by showing
that he acted reasonably at an earlier stage to reduce the probability of lapsing. Courts are
reluctant to admit such a defense in road accidents. In exceptional case, however, courts
refuse to consider a momentary lapse of attention as negligence per se. One such case is
Plowman v. Digatono. In this case, the plaintiff stopped its car at a red light, proceeded
forward when the light turned green, then stopped in the intersection to avoid striking a
car in front of him. Defendant ran into the rear end of plaintiff's car. The collision
occurred as defendant looked away from traffic for a "moment" to hang up the
microphone on his car radio. The jury found that the defendant was not negligent, and the
Court of Appeals upheld the jury's decision, stating that "the district court did not err in
… allowing the jury to consider whether… [defendant's] momentary lapse of attention to
replace his microphone was a reasonable excuse for his conduct."8
In two categories of cases, drivers' lapses are insufficient for imposition of
liability. The first category concerns guest statutes that govern the liability of a driver
toward a guest in his car. Under these statutes, a lapse in precaution is not enough to
satisfy the requirements of driver’s liability to a guest. Liability requires the driver’s
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.9 Gross negligence and willful and
wanton misconduct go to the quality of self-monitoring. They often imply a knowing or
deliberate choice of unreasonable second order behavior.
The second category concerns sudden emergencies on roads and elsewhere. One
7

See Porter v. State, 88 So. 2d 924. In deciding a criminal case on manslaughter, Justice O'connell noted
that "There are few, if any, persons who drive automobiles who have not, through momentary lapse of
attention, error of judgment, failing to see what they should have seen, particularly on roads not in
municipalities, been guilty of running a stop sign at an intersection without slowing down. Such, no doubt,
constitutes negligence sufficient to support a damage suit based on simple negligence. We doubt that it
would support a verdict under our guest statute. Nor do we believe that it is sufficient to support a verdict
of manslaughter." Ibid., at 926 (Emphasis added).
8
See Plowman v. Digatono, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1291. The defendant was a policeman who drove a
police car.
9
See Hoffman v. Slocum, 219 Cal. App. 2d 100. The court imposed liability on a driver toward a guest,
reasoning that "the trier of the fact was entitled to infer that this was not simply an error of judgment or a
momentary lapse of attention on the driver's part". See also Porter v. State, supra note 3; Bobstein v.
Splinter, supra note 4.
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court formulated the sudden emergency doctrine, which many courts have recognized, as
follows:
"One who suddenly finds himself in a position of imminent peril, without
sufficient time to consider and weigh all the circumstances or best means
that may be adopted to avoid an impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."10

According to this formulation, the sudden emergency doctrine does not lower the
standard of care required of a motorist before the emergency occurs.11 The sudden
emergency doctrine cannot be invoked by one who has brought the emergency on himself
by his own wrong or who has not used due care to avoid it. If the actor took reasonable
care before the sudden emergency, then this legal doctrine lowers the standard of care
applicable in the sudden emergency. In our language, second-order reasonableness
provides a defense against liability for first order negligence in a sudden.
B. Medical Malpractice
Turning to medical malpractice, doctors are held liable for the consequences of
their negligence in making decisions and executing them. Many medical accidents are the
result of errors, and errors are often caused by lapses.12 Lapses in decisions include
failing to diagnose, choosing the wrong drug to administer, choosing the wrong technique
to perform, using the wrong medical equipment, omitting tests needed to diagnose the
patient’s illness, or deciding to operate too early or too late. Lapses in execution include
administering a different drug from the one intended, incorrectly performing a medical
technique, using medical equipment improperly, misreading results of diagnostic tests,
operating on the wrong patient or the wrong body part, leaving a sponge inside a patient's
10

Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Company, 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385 (La.1972).
Dick v. Phillips, 253 La. 366, 218 So.2d 299, 302 (La.1969).
12
For a profound analysis, both positive and normative, of errors, lapses, and related occurrences in the
field of medicine, see Merry & McCall Smith (2006). For data on the medical errors and their huge
contribution to patients' injury, see Cimasi (2005). For the argument that systemic errors are major causes
for most medical accidents even if typically combined with individual errors, and for a comprehensive
account of all types of medical errors based on extensive empirical evidence, see Mello & Studdert (2008).
11
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body, failing to sterilize medical equipment, and failing to monitor the patient's
condition.13
Anecdotal evidence from the case law suggests that doctors are more often found
liable for failures in execution than for failures in judgment.14 One reason could be
implicit recognition of a second order reasonableness defense. Thus courts sometimes
exempt physicians from liability for an error of judgment if they acted in good faith.15
Good faith depends to a large extent upon second order behavior. When doctors prepared
reasonably before making a decision, courts often exempt them from liability for making
the wrong decision. For example, when a doctor decides to deliver a baby by Cesarean,
courts will ordinarily not check the reasonableness of his decision so long as they are
convinced he prepared properly to make it. In contrast, once the method is decided for
delivering the baby, the courts are reluctant to excuse faulty execution on grounds of
reasonable preparation.16
A second possible reason why courts are more hesitant in imposing liability for
doctor's misjudgment is difficulties of proof. Lapses in execution are relatively easy to
observe, whereas misjudgments require second-guessing. Many misjudgments remain
undetected or unproved, so they do not trigger liability.

13

For a comprehensive list of causes for patients' injury which include those mentioned in the text and
many others, see Orlikoff & Vanagunas (1988); Mello & Studdert, supra note. For case law illustrations of
execution failures, see Rivera v. Anilesh, 869 N.E.2d 654 (2007) (negligent performance of injections of
anesthesia and extraction of a tooth could result in dentists' liability); Vanderpool v. Adirondack
Neurosurgical Specialists, P.C., 846 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2007) (failing to diagnose plaintiff's bilateral pars
defect, which was evident from X rays and an MRI, prior to performing spinal surgery.); Powell v.
Kleinman, 151 Cal. App. 4th 112 (2007) (Failing to ascertain results of a test administered for the patient);
Mobile Infirmary Association v. Tyler 2007 Ala. LEXIS 192 (2007).
14
Similarly, in the field of liability of public authorities, courts are much more willing to impose liability
for execution of operational, rather than discretional powers. Dobbs (2000) See also Brooth & Squires
(2005) (distinguishing between policy and operational decisions of the public authority and indicating
courts' enhanced willingness to impose liability for the latter rather than for the former).
15
See Dotson v. Hammerman, 932 S.W. 2d 880 (Mo. App. 1996); Dobbs, supra note. See also Hyman &
Silver (2006) (citing several studies and stipulating that "[a]ll find that the merits matter, and some find that
the merits matter more than anything else. Plaintiffs who received substandard care generally obtained
compensation… plaintiffs who received proper care generally did not… and plaintiffs whose care quality
was uncertain wound up in between").
16
See discussion infra.
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Powell v. Kleinman, decided by a Californian Court of Appeal,17 illustrates these
points. In this case a patient sued his doctors for harms resulting from failure to diagnose
promptly and treat an injury to his spinal cord. The plaintiff alleged doctors' negligence
manifested in three ways:
1. The doctors initially failed to test for spinal weakness, discover weakness, or
note findings of weakness. Here the doctors seem to have weighed alternatives
and decided that tests were unnecessary.
2. When the plaintiff’s symptoms continued, the doctors decided to evaluate the
patient using an MRI test, and they failed to do so.
3. The doctors allegedly decided to rely on the hospital to test for spinal cord
compromise. The doctors assumed that the staff at the hospital had tested for
cord compromise without confirming it had done so.
On defendant’s appeal for summary judgment, the Court of Appeal faced the
question of whether any of the plaintiff's allegations could give rise to the doctors'
liability. The Court decided that the first allegation, which concern bad judgment, could
not give rises to doctors’ liability. The Court decided that the 2nd and 3rd allegations,
which concern bad execution, could give rise to the doctors' liability.
Reluctance to second guess doctors' judgments is also reflected in Section 6.03 of
the California Civil Jury Instructions18 which states as follows:
"Where there is more than one recognized method of diagnosis or treatment, and
no one of them is used exclusively and uniformly by all practitioners of good
standing, under the same or similar circumstances, a physician is not negligent if,
in exercising [his] [or] [her] best judgment, [he] [or] [she] selects one of the
approved methods, which later turns out to be a wrong selection, or one not
favored by certain other practitioners."
Juries following these instructions will find no liability for many lapses in
judgment. Thus a doctor's bad decision to deliver a baby by Cesarean, when vaginal birth
would have been better, will seldom trigger liability.

17
18

Powell v. Kleinman, 151 Cal. App. 4th 112 (2007).
These are the official instructions for jury approved by the Judicial Council.
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The preceding discussion of doctrine and cases suggests that courts' impose
liability for faulty executions more readily than for faulty judgments. Do statistics bear
this out? We know of no data explicitly on point, but available data implicitly suggests a
positive answer. The National Practitioner Data Bank (2005)19 includes 191,082 medical
malpractice claims, both tried and settled, brought by patients in 1991-2005. The claims
are arranged by category. Upon examination, these categories suggest to us that roughly
80% of the claims were brought for faulty execution and 20% were brought for
misjudgments. 20
C. Products Liability
Manufacturing inevitably results in some defective items, and quality control
reduces the frequency with which defective items harm consumers. We distinguish the
relevant behavior into first and second order. Roughly speaking, manufacturing the
product is first order behavior, and quality control is second order behavior. Thus a
manufacture of a soft drink must fill bottles, which is first order behavior, and he also
must monitor the bottles for cracks or overcharging with gas, which is second order
behavior. The more carefully the manufacturer monitors, the less often a cracked or
overcharged bottle reaches consumers
At the beginning of the 20th century, the common law imposed a negligence rule
on manufacturers for defective products that harmed consumers. To recover damages, the
consumer had to prove that a defective product caused the injury and the manufacturer’s
negligence caused the defect. The second part of the proof usually involved showing that
the manufacturer’s quality control, which is second order behavior, was unreasonable.21

19

Public Use Data File (computer file): http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/publicdata.html.
37,805 claims were brought for failed diagnose—probably more judgment than execution claims. Most
of the rest were brought for various types of faulty execution. Thus 16,356 claims were brought for delay in
treatment, 3,286 for failed monitoring, 3,943 for failed performance of a procedure, 12,275 for improper
management, 28,931 for improper performance, 857 for improper use of equipment, 2054 for administering
treatment on a wrong body part, 1562 for administering wrong dosage of medication and 1,913 for
administering wrong medication.
21
See Henderson & Eisenberg (1990) (claiming that "the growth of products liability undoubtedly has
increased corporate safety consciousness…"); Epstien (1999). Imperfect quality control causes a few items
in a manufacturing process to fall short of the design that the others satisfy. In contrast, a defect in design
affects all items manufactured according to that design. Manufacturing and design defects require a
20
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Thus we describe the rule of consumer products liability at the beginning of the 20th
century as a second order negligence rule.
Consumers seldom had enough evidence about manufacturer’s quality control to
meet this burden of proof. To allow more recoveries by injured consumers, American
courts in the early 20th century applied the doctrine of res ipsa. According to this
doctrine, the court should infer the defendant's negligence if the specific accident belongs
to a type that regularly results from negligence, and if two more conditions are satisfied.22
The manufacturer was liable when the consumer showed that he was injured by a
defective product under these conditions, unless the manufacturer could prove that its
quality control satisfied the legal standard.23
The original liability rule required the plaintiff to prove second order
unreasonableness in order to recover. The rule of res ipsa allowed the defendant to
escape liability by proving second order reasonableness. Thus the change in rules
reversed the burden of proof concerning second order reasonableness. The doctrine of
res ipsa was an intermediate step towards the contemporary liability rule. In the course
of the 20th century, most jurisdictions changed the rule to strict liability. This change
eliminated the manufacturer’s right to defend itself by showing reasonable quality
control. If a product is unreasonably dangerous, the manufacturer is strictly liable for the
harm the defect causes to consumers, and no amount of quality control excuses the
manufacturer.24
D. Violating Statutory Duties
Now we consider another example of a second order defense recognized in many
jurisdictions. A breach of statutory duty that results in harm creates a presumption that
separate analysis in the law of torts. This article discusses the former and not the latter. For a discussion of
the distinction, see Epstein, supra note, at 406-8; Cooter & Ulen (2007).
22
The other two conditions are that the event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; and that it was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff. See Epstein, supra note, at 172; Porat & Stein (2001).
23
Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., 145 N.E. 281 (Mass. 1924); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
150 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
24

Epstein, supra note, at 389-94;
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the defendant was negligent. In many jurisdictions, the defendant is entitled to rebut this
presumption by showing that he behaved reasonably. Many courts maintain that an actor
is excused for violating a statute when he shows that "he did what might reasonably be
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who
desired to comply with the law."25 In the case where a lapse causes the breach of the
statutory duty, proof of second-order reasonableness may provide a sufficient defense
against liability.
The case of Waugh v. Traxler, decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, illustrates our point.26 In this case the defendant's vehicle crossed the center line
of an icy roadway and struck the plaintiffs' oncoming vehicle. The defendant violated
traffic regulations by losing control of her car and driving in the wrong lane.
Notwithstanding, the jury found that the defendant was not negligent. The Court of
Appeal maintained that "the undisputed facts indicate a violation of the statute," but they
only create a "rebuttable prima facie presumption of negligence." The presumption of
negligence was rebutted mostly by the reasonableness of the defendant’s second order
behavior:
"[T]he [defendant] offered evidence of her recognition of the hazardous
conditions and her attempts to prevent the accident. She departed for work
especially early… because she realized that the roads were hazardous. She further
testified that she was fully aware of the hazardous conditions and had exercised
extreme caution in the operation of her vehicle. She also directs attention to the
testimony of State Police Trooper… to the effect that even he was unable to
appreciate the full extent of the icy conditions until he stepped out of his vehicle
25

Alarid v. Vanier 50 Cal. 2d 617, 624, 327 P. 2d 897 (1958); Witham v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 561
N.E.2d 484 (Ind. 1990) (a motorist was injured when his automobile was struck by a train, where the
crossing flashers had been malfunctioning for many years. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, saying
that "[t]he facts clearly demonstrate genuine issues regarding whether the notoriously malfunctioning
flashers 'gave warning' so as to give rise to a possible statutory violation, and even if so, whether Witham
acted as would a reasonable person under similar circumstances who desired to comply with the law.");
Leikin v. Wilson, 445 A.2d 993 (D.C. App. 1982) (The defendant's brakes were defective, in violation of
statute, and the brake failure caused the accident. Since the defendant neither knew nor reasonably could
have known that the brakes were defective the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower court that the defendant was not negligent, stating that the evidence supported a finding that
the defendant had effectively rebutted the presumption of negligence. Id. at 1002). See also Restatement 2d
Torts §288A (containing a list of situations, in which violations are excused, e.g. when the actor is unable
after reasonable diligence or care to comply.); Dobbs, supra note, §140, at 330.
26
Waugh v. Traxler, 186 W. Va. 355, 412 S.E. 2d 756 (1991).

13

and attempted to walk on the road. She explained that she was exercising caution
in driving but was unable to avoid the accident due to the icy conditions."
In other cases, courts have exempted defendants from liability for violation of statutory
duties if the injurer did not know, and could not reasonably discover, that his act violated
a statute.27
E. Defamation
Under defamation law, a plaintiff must prove injury from the defendant’s false
assertion. The false assertion can be regarded as first order behavior. This proof,
however, is not enough for liability. Thus communication errors, erroneous deductions,
incorrect inferences, and ambiguous articulations are not enough for liability.28 In
addition, a plaintiff who is a private individual must establish that the defendant was
negligent.29 The relevant kind of negligence often involves failure to make reasonable
effort to check information and verify its truth, which can be regarded as second order
behavior.30 Thus the required negligence under defamation law is typically second order,

27

Restatement 2d Torts §288A(2)(b) ("Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such
excuse, its violation is excused when he (the actor – R.C & A.P. ) neither knows nor should know of the
occasion of compliance". But the injurer will not be excused if the statute requires investigation and
knowledge. See Smith v. Owen 841 S.W. 2d 828 (Tenn. App. 1992); Dobbs, supra note, §140, at 330. The
same is true if the statute is interpreted to impose strict liability. See Dobbs, ibid., §141, at 331-2.
28
Dobbs, supra note, §419, at 1182. Even partial erroneous facts are often not enough for liability. Prosser
and Keeton say that it is sufficient to show that the charge or imputation is "substantially true, or as it is
often put, to justify the 'gist', the 'sting' or the 'substantial truth' of the defamation, Prosser & Keeton (1984).
See also Campbell v. Quad City Times; Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publication; in Casteel v. News-Record
Inc. the Court concluded that "the ordinary and obvious meaning of fair does not require that the report be
true or accurate… What is required for the privilege to apply is that the report have qualities of impartiality
and honesty, and be free from prejudice, favoritism and self-interest."
On the other hand, in Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc. it was decided that "[a] report that
intentionally excludes information that is… obviously exculpatory… simply cannot, under any definition,
be deemed either fair or accurate."
29
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (deciding that so long as the states do not impose
liability without fault, they may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual). A different rule applies to public
officials or public figures under the Supreme Court decision of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), according to which liability for defamation is conditioned upon the defendant being guilty of
publishing a knowing or reckless falsehood.
30
See Dobbs, supra note, § 419, at 1182. Cooter formulated the gathering of information to support an
assertion as an optimal problem. In this framework, negligence consists in stopping too soon. See Cooter
(2000), and Bar-gill & Hamdani (2003).
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not first order.31
F. The "Business Judgment Rule"
Stockholders sometimes sue corporate directors when they make bad decisions
and lower the value of the company’s shares. As formulated in Smith v. Van Gorkom the
business judgment rule prohibits courts in such cases from second-guessing directors'
substantive decisions.32 Instead, courts may consider only the quality of the directors'
decision-making process, especially the information that they gathered before deciding.33
Thus a director who prepares to make a business decision, decides in good faith, and
makes the wrong choice in the circumstances, escapes liability to stockholders for harm
that the right decision would have avoided. To recover damages, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant’s bad judgment caused the harm, and also prove that the defendant was
negligent in preparing to make the decision.
In our language, the bad decision is first order behavior, and preparation to decide
is second order behavior. The business judgment rule thus allows a defense of second
order reasonableness for an unreasonable first order behavior.34

31

In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, 188 Colo. 86, plaintiffs brought a libel suit against a newspaper, an
editor, and a reporter. The court held that when a defamatory statement was published concerning one who
was not a public official or a public figure, but the matter involved was of public or general concern, the
publisher would be liable to the person defamed only if he knew that the statement was false or if he made
the statement with reckless disregard of whether it was true or not. The court determined that "a simple
negligence rule would cast such a chilling effect upon the news media that it would print insufficient facts
in order to protect itself against libel actions". Id. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) the
Supreme Court held that "reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."
32
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). For a discussion, see Stout & Blair (2001). The
business judgment rule is considered to be the main reason for the rarity of court decisions imposing
liability on directors: see Black & Cheffins (2006). The rule was adopted by most states including
Delaware: Barton, Block & Radin (1998).
33
The business judgment rule has various formulations. A leading book phrased it: "the [business judgment
rule's] terms are far less important than the fact that there is special deferential approach." Easterbrook &
Fischel (1991).
34
"The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of
business judgment – even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes – unless certain
exceptions apply." (Emphasis added). Clark (1986). The main justification for the business judgment rule is
that shareholders prefer a lenient standard of liability for their directors, believing it serves their goals.
Many corporations adopted directors/officers liability indemnity provisions. See Danielson & Karpoff
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G. Summary
Given that first order precaution is probabilistic, a crucial question for tort law is
whether or not a liability rule allows a defense of second order reasonableness. We
explained that the prevailing rule of negligence in everyday accidents, such as driving,
usually disallows a defense of second order reasonableness. Likewise, the prevailing rule
of strict liability for consumer injuries caused by manufacturing disallows a defense of
second order reasonableness.35 However, the prevailing rules of tort law sometimes
allow a second order defense, especially for faulty judgments by expert decision makers,
or emergency situations, or breach of statutory duties. Instead of the defendant having to
prove second order reasonableness, defamation law sometimes requires the plaintiff to
prove second order negligence by the defendant.

II. Model of Lapses
The first formal model of comparative tort rules, which was published in 1973,
became the standard model.36 Under all forms of the negligence rule, courts decide
liability by comparing an actor’s actual precaution to the legal standard. In the standard
model, injurers exactly satisfy the legal standard in order to escape liability. Setting the
legal standard at the optimal level of care, consequently, causes actors to take optimal
precaution.
The standard model did not encompass uncertainty. In many economic models,
introducing uncertainty does not change individual behavior, or does not change average

(1998) (documenting a large increase in the use of corporate governance provisions in the late 1980s,
showing that in a sample of 513 companies – primarily S&P 500 – 17 companies had director / officer
liability indemnity provision in 1984, and in 1989 the number of companies rose to 441).
35
As we have explained, we focus on products liability for manufacturing defects: supra note. With design
defects the distinction between first and second order negligence disappears.
36
Brown (1973) In the standard model, no one is negligent in equilibrium (or else everyone is negligent in
equilibrium), which contradicts the basic fact of tort liability: Some acts are negligently performed. A small
modification of the standard model allows actors, for whom precaution is idiosyncratically expensive, to
choose a level of care that courts judge to be unreasonable – hence the oxymoron “intentional negligence.”
See Cooter (1983) ("If punitive damages exactly offset the injurer's illicit benefits, then his cost function
will look just like that of an ordinary injurer in the zone of liability…").
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behavior, provided that the distribution of errors is unbiased37 and actors are riskneutral.38 This was not the case when uncertainty was introduced into the standard model
of negligence rules.39 In the standard model without uncertainty, injurers exactly satisfy
the legal standard in order to escape liability. With uncertainty, injurers do not know for
sure whether or not a given level of precaution that they take will enable them to escape
liability. An actor’s costs usually jump up when his precaution falls below the legal
standard of care.40 When costs are discontinuous at the legal standard, uncertainty causes
actors to change their individual and average behavior, even when errors are unbiased
and actors are risk-neutral.41 In principle, the change can result in precaution above or
below the social optimum. Under reasonable assumptions, however, the change results in
excessive precaution.42 The standard model of negligence under uncertainty predicts that
injurers will take socially inefficient precaution.

37

An unbiased estimation of a value is equally likely to err in either direction -- too high or too low. Many
errors are normally distributed with zero mean. The normal distribution is one form of an unbiased
distribution.
38
Economists traditionally assumed that people are neutral with respect to small risks and averse to large
risks. See Arrow (1974). Cognitive psychology successfully challenged these assumptions by proving
experimentally that the context of a decision frames the way an actor decides what to do. Cognitive
psychology, or its fraternal twin, behavioral economics, improves the realism of assumptions about risk.
This improvement, however, often does not change the traditional approach to modeling. Risk-averse or
risk-seeking behavior differs from risk-neutral behavior in ways that are intuitive and easily modeled. So a
formal theory of tort liability usually begins by assuming risk neutrality and later introduces corrections to
increase the model’s realism.
39
Calfee & Craswell (1984) (saying that the standard model fails to explain why some acts are negligently
performed).
40
The discontinuity of liability under rule of negligence and its behavioral consequences were originally
explained in Cooter, supra note 36, at 91 (claiming that "a negligence rule creates a threshold or jump in the
potential injurer's costs."). Grady argued against Cooter that courts would not actually hold injurers liable
for more harm than they actually caused by negligently untaken precautions. See Grady (1989) ("the
economic modeler's claim that the negligence rule contains an incentive-distorting discontinuity crucially
depends on the assumption that courts are trying to find global minima, and on the related supposition that
the breach-of-duty and cause in-fact issues are independent.").See See also Kahan (1989); Craswell (1986)
(advocating liability for incremental damages which is the difference between the social losses inflicted by
injurers' activity and the social losses that would have been inflicted had they complied with the legal
standard). Cooter replied that the discontinuity is due to incomplete information by the courts, which is the
case in fact. See Cooter (1989) (commenting that "[i]mperfection in the court's causal attribution may be
due to the fact that some of the needed information is difficult or impossible to obtain…").
41
See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 40, at 966 ("many traditional conclusions of the law-and-economics
literature can no longer be defended on economic grounds… All of these conclusions hold even when
defendants are risk-neutral."); Cooter & Ulen (1986) (discussing attitudes toward risk).
42
Calfee & Craswell (1984); Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, "An Economic Case for Comparative
Negligence", 61 New York University Law Review 1067 (1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of
Accident Law (Harvard University Press, 1987), pages 80-83; Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and
Economics (1st Edition, Scott Foresman, 1988) pages 400-403.
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Uncertainty over liability can take various forms. One form arises from
randomness in the legal standard of care, which makes the injurer uncertain about the
standard that the court will apply to his behavior. Another form arises from randomness
in observing the defendant’s actual care, which makes the injurer uncertain about the
actual level of care that the court will find that he has taken. A third form arises from
randomness in precautionary behavior, which makes the actor uncertain about how much
precaution his efforts will realize.43
We use the term “lapses” to describe the third form of uncertainty—uncertainty
about how much precaution the actor’s efforts will realize. If lapses cause most negligent
injuries, as we believe, then the existing literature is thin relative to the subject’s
importance. Some previous papers have discussed lapses by name,44 but most authors
have discussed the mathematical form of lapses while using different terminology.
To illustrate, we will restate the conclusion of the standard model under
uncertainty in Shavell’s language and in our language. Shavell (1987) defines
“momentary care” as the sum of the care that the injurer can control and a random
variable. The random variable prevents full control of momentary care. When deciding
liability, courts focus on the instant of the injury. Courts hold the injurer liable for harm
caused by momentary care that falls short of the legal standard, regardless of the injurer’s
level of controlled care. Courts do so because they can observe momentary precaution
and they cannot observe controlled care. Under general assumptions, the injurer has
incentives to take more or less controlled care than the socially efficient level.

Under

reasonable (but not general) assumptions, the injurer has incentives to take more than the
socially efficient level of controlled care.45
We restate this argument in our language. “Momentary care” corresponds to “first
order precaution,” and the “controlled care” corresponds to second order precaution.
Second order precaution and a random error determine first order precaution. The rule
that the injurer is liable for harm caused by unreasonable momentary care corresponds to
43

Shavell (1987) pages 81-83.
Grady (1988); Grady (1989); Cooter (1991).
45
Shavell (1987) pages 81-83, 93-96. Shavell also rightly pointed out that momentary level of care is an
imperfect indicator of the true, but unobservable, level of care and wondered whether courts might
sometimes lower the level of due care in implicit recognition of the injurers' problem in controlling their
momentary level of care. Ibid., at page 81-82.
44
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a “first order negligence rule.” Momentary care that falls below the legal standard
corresponds to a “negligent lapse.” The proposition that a negligence rule causes the
injurer to take socially inefficient controlled care corresponds to the proposition that a
first order negligence rule causes socially inefficient precaution.46
Now we use some notation to explain our model and how it differs from its
predecessor. x1 indicates first order precaution, which is a random variable. x1* indicates
the legal standard for precaution x1. The vertical line at x1* partitions Figure 1 into
negligent and non-negligent zones. If an accident occurs when x1<x1*, and the accident
would not have occurred if x1>x1*, then the actor’s negligent lapse caused the accident.
By definition, a first order negligence rule holds the actor liable for harms caused by
negligent lapses.
x2 indicates second order precaution (e.g. preparation and self-monitoring).
p(x1|x2) indicates the probability density function for first order precaution, conditional
on second order precaution. In Figure 1, the actor’s particular value of second order
precaution x2 equals ã. The shaded area in Figure 1 depicts the probability of first order
negligence, which equals the cumulative probability: P(x1*|ã) =

0

∫

x1*

p(x1|ã) dx1. An

injurer who takes second order precaution ã will lapse with probability P(x1*|ã), and not
lapse with probability 1-P(x1*|ã).

46

Arlen and MacCloud’s model of medical malpractice makes a major advance by explicitly incorporating
insurance and health care organizations. Our focus, however, is on a component of this model in which an
individual physician has to make a decision. The probability that the physician knows which decision is
the right one depends on luck and information. The physician’s “expertise” determines the extent of his
information. In our terminology, the physician’s “decision” is first order precaution, and the physicians
“expertise” is second order precaution. The authors conclude that holding physicians liable for the harm
caused by bad decisions provides socially efficient incentives, provided that courts set damages according
to a novel formula that they specify. Arlen & MacLeod (2003, 2005).
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Figure 1: Probability of a Negligent Lapse
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More second order precaution x2 will reduce the probability of a lapse, as
indicated by a change in the probability density function. The increase in second order
precaution may increase the mean of first order precaution as when a driver aims for a
lower average speed, or reduce its variance as when a driver checks the speedometer
more often. Figure 2 depicts a change in mean and variance caused by an increase in x2
from the relatively low value denoted ã in Figure 1 to the relatively high value denoted â
in Figure 2. The decrease in size of the shaded area in Figure 2 as compared to Figure 1
indicates a fall in the probability of a lapse.

Figure 2: Shift in Probability of a Negligent Lapse
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By definition, the socially optimal level of second order precaution, which we
denote x2*, minimizes the sum of the cost of accidents and the cost of precaution. In the
standard model of negligence under uncertainty, as mentioned above, the possibility of
lapses can result in excessive or deficient precaution relative to the social optimum.47 To
illustrate, assume that the socially optimal level of second order precaution equals the
level of precaution ã that generates the probability distribution in Figure 1.

The

prevailing liability rule, however, might induce the injurer to take second order
precaution equal to â that generates the probability distribution in Figure 2. Thus the
socially optimal distribution of accidents in Figure 1 differs from the distribution in
Figure 2 that minimizes the injurer’s private costs.
The standard model of liability under uncertainty assumes that second order
precaution is a control variable and first order precaution is uncontrolled. This stylization
of the facts makes sense. At a minimum, random errors often infect first order precaution
more than second order precaution.

Thus drivers choose their intended speed and

imprecisely control their actual speed; manufacturers choose their rate of product
sampling and imprecisely control the number of defective products; and corporate
directors prepare to decide and imprecisely control the consequences of their decisions.
To study such cases, we retain the standard assumption that random errors infect first
order precaution and not second order precaution. Modeling second order randomness, or
even randomness in higher orders than second, is possible but not desirable for our
purposes.48
Now we analyze the incentive effects of applying a legal standard to second order
precaution. Recall that a first order negligence rule assigns liability for harm as follows:
x1< x1* => injurer is liable
x1> x1* => injurer is not liable.

47

Calfee & Craswell (1984); Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen (1987); Shavell (1987), pages 80-83; Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (1st Edition, Scott Foresman, 1988) pages 400-403.
48
To model second order errors, we could assume that third order precaution and a random variable
determine second order precaution. And we can keep going to higher orders. Higher order of lapses are
relevant to studying irresolute intentions of drivers, the failure of quality control workers to sample at the
rate prescribed by management, and accidental failure of corporate directors to obtain information that they
sought for making a decision.
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Similarly, applying a standard of negligence to second order behavior has this form:
x2< x2* => injurer is liable
x2> x2* => injurer is not liable.
The injurer is liable for harm caused by x2 falling below the legal standard x2*, and the
injurer has a defense when x2 equals or exceeds the legal standard x2*.
Now we extend the standard model of negligence under uncertainty by allowing
the injurer to make an additional choice. Besides choosing second order precaution, the
injurer in our model controls whether or not the court can observe the choice. Assume
that the injurer can spend k before the accident occurs, which will make his precaution x2
observable by the court. For example, a doctor can perform tests before deciding to
operate on a patient and then provide the test data to the court; or a driver can record his
speed and then provide the record to the court; or a CEO can document his diligence
before selling a corporate opportunity and then provide the documents to the court.
Without expenditure k, precaution x2 is not observable by the court.
Different liability rules give different incentives for the injurer to make his
precaution observable to the court. Consider the rule that dominates prevailing tort law: a
rule of liability for first order negligence rule with no second order defense. The injurer’s
second order behavior is irrelevant to liability, so he has no legal incentive to make it
observable. This is the standard situation analyzed above where a first order negligence
rule and a random error in first order precaution cause the injurer to take socially
inefficient precaution.
Next, consider a liability rule requiring the plaintiff to prove first and second
order negligence. The plaintiff must prove both that x1<x1* and that x2<x2* in order to
recover damages. This rule prevailed in the early 20th century in product liability cases.
To recover under this rule, the consumer must prove that he was injured by a defective
product (x1<x1*) and the manufacturer’s negligence (x2<x2*) caused the defect.49 If x2 is
unobservable, the plaintiff cannot prove x2< x2*, so the injurer escapes liability,
regardless of whether his second order precaution is reasonable or unreasonable. So the
injurer has no incentive to make his second order precaution observable. Having escaped
liability, tort law provides no incentive for the injurer to take reasonable precaution. So a
49

Supra.
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second order negligence rule with the burden of proof on the plaintiff causes deficient
second order precaution by the injurer.
Finally, consider a negligence rule with a defense of second order reasonableness.
If the plaintiff proves that x1<x1*, then the defendant must prove that x2> x2* in order to
avoid liability. This rule exists in a limited way in some areas of law, as shown in Part I.
The injurer can escape liability by making his second order precaution observable,
provided it is reasonable. If cost k is not too high, the injurer will take reasonable second
order precaution and make it observable to the court as a defense against liability.50 Thus
a rule of first order negligence with a defense of second order reasonableness will often
causes injurers to satisfy the legal standard for second order precaution and make this fact
observable.51

We summarize these arguments:
Proposition. Assume that the injurer controls second order precaution x2, and the
injurer’s first order precaution x1 is a function of x2 and a random error term. The
injurer can spend k to make x2 observable; otherwise it is unobservable.
• Under a negligence rule without a second order defense, x2 will be
unobservable and socially inefficient.
• Under a rule requiring the plaintiff to prove first and second order
negligence, x2 will be unobservable and socially deficient.

50

Note, that if law allows a defense of second order reasonableness, then actors will tend to favor activities
where second order precaution is easier for courts to observe. Thus courts should especially allow a defense
of second order reasonableness when it wants to favor an activity with observable second order precaution
and to disfavor a substitute activity with unobservable second order precaution. The court should favor one
activity over a close substitute when the former has positive externalities. See infra.
51
This conclusion resembles the proposition that a rule of strict liability discourages corporations from
reporting harms that they cause, whereas a rule of negligence encourages them to report cases where the
corporation has a defense of reasonable precaution. See Arlen and Kraakman (1997).
Note that the second order reasonableness defense applies to lapses, not to intentional fault. Distinguishing
between them can be difficult, as an example illustrates. (We are grateful to Mark Geistfeld for this
example). Suppose that the driver of car swerves and hits a parked car. The driver contends that his foot
accidentally slipped on the gas pedal, so the accident resulted from a lapse. The plaintiff contends that the
driver swerved because he reached for a cassette on the floor, so the accident resulted from intentional
fault. If the liability rule permits a defense of second order reasonableness for lapses, it applies to the first
possibility and not to the second. Before determining whether the defendant can offer a defense of second
order reasonableness, the court will have to decide whether the accident’s cause was a lapse or intentional
fault. This decision may be easy or hard, but it is no different in kind from many other factual questions
that courts must resolve.
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• Under a first order negligence rule with a second order defense, x2 will be
observable and equal to the legal standard, provided that k is not too
large.
This proposition grounds our policy recommendation: Make a defense of second
order reasonableness available more generally. The defense is an “information-forcing
mechanism.” It is useful whenever courts need to induce injurers to reveal their second
order behavior in order to improve incentives for precaution.52 The next two sections
explain that the defense is also useful when the underlying activity has positive
externalities, or when expanding the defense causes injurers to substitute less dangerous
activities for more dangerous ones.

III. Negative and Positive Externalities
Under a first order negligence rule, the actor escapes liability whenever his first
order behavior satisfies the legal standard of precaution. When the actor escapes liability,
the harm from the accident is not a private cost of the actor, although it is a social cost of
engaging in the activity. The standard model concludes that a negligence rule externalizes
the social cost of engaging in the activity, so the activity level is excessive.53 A defense
of second order negligence opens the gap further by allowing some injurers to escape the
social costs of their lapses. So a defense of second order negligence aggravates the
problem of excessive activity caused by a first order negligence rule.
We have explained that the defense of second order reasonableness worsens
incentives for activities with external costs,54 such as driving in Example 1. The opposite

52

Arlen and MacLeod (2003 & 2005) do not favor defense of second order unreasonableness. Such a
defense is unnecessary in their model because courts do not need to use it to force injurers to reveal
information about second order precaution. So the Arlen an MacLeon model applies to a world where
second order precaution is observable, and our model applies to a world where is it revealable.
53
Shavell (1987), pages 21-32.
54
Removing the defense of second order reasonableness reduces the expected cost of engaging in the
activity while taking reasonable precaution. Consequently, more people engage in the activity, they have
more lapses, and the lapses cause more injuries. So removing the defense improves incentives with respect
to activity level. Incentives may not improve with respect to second order precaution. Most actors satisfy
the legal stand of second order precaution in order to have a defense against liability. Appropriate choice of
the legal standard for second order precaution x2*, consequently, can induce socially optimal second order
behavior in spite of external costs. In our model, second order behavior is the only way to affect the
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is true for activities with external benefits, such as practicing medicine in Example 2.
Doctors benefit patients and some of the benefits are not captured by prices.55 Doctors
also create benefits to third parties who do not pay for them.56 Similarly volunteers get
paid nothing for helping others.
The two types of externalities – positive and negative – suggest a reason for
allowing or disallowing a defense of second order reasonableness. They tend to allow the
defense of second order reasonableness for activities that convey unpriced benefits on
others. When external effects are beneficial, the law should encourage these activities by
lightening the burden of liability. However, the law should not encourage activities that
convey unpriced costs on others. When external effects are harmful, the law should
discourage these activities by increasing the burden of liability.
External benefits of the underlying activity can justify at least one of the
"pockets" of second order negligence discussed in the previous part of the paper. When
journalists write stories about people, they risk being sued for defamation. However,
journalism distributes information whose value to the public exceeds the price collected
by the journalists who supply it. We previously explained that defamation law sometimes
conditions liability on second order reasonableness. This reduces the burden of liability
on journalists.
As discussed above, another pocket of second order negligence is the reluctance
probability distribution over first order behavior, so optimal second order behavior necessarily achieves the
optimal distribution over first order behavior.
55
See Bloch & Nelson Jr. (1997) ("Commentators who consider health a non-marketable good contend that
there are elements of health which, though valuable, are unquantifiable, such as hope, compassion, and the
extension and preservation of life … Health's social benefits are not fully realized by the market price it
commands"). Marmor, Boyer & Greenberg (1981) ("Improved health, the anticipated outcome of medical
care, has positive externalities. This makes medical care a merit good, and, unlike many other economic
goods, one that should not be allocated solely on the basis of ability to pay"). Rome (1981). See also
Campbell-Eaton (1984) ("Moreover, health care usually is viewed as a "merit good," with benefits
extending beyond its economic value. This view is reinforced by the ethical mandates of the health
professions and by a widespread belief that "more is better" in the provision of medical services").
On the inability of doctors to pass higher insurance costs along to patients, see Eisler, Appleby & Kasindorf
(2003) (Claiming that the cause of this inability is the limitations on reimbursements made by managed
care insurers, Medicare and Medicaid).
56
Ibid. See also Cooter & Porat (2006). We endorse the view that positive externalities exceed the negative
externalities. See Cooter & Porat, supra note. For the argument that medical practice has negative
externalities due to the fact that many patients who sustained injury as a result of negligence do not sue, see
Baker (2005). For the argument that many patients do not bring suits and for the reasons for that, see
Hyman & Silver, supra note.
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of courts to second-guest the decisions of doctors. Allowing a second order defense for
bad decisions by doctors reduces the burden of liability on the practice of medicine. The
same case can be made in favor of recognizing a second order defense for bad executions
of decisions by doctors. Why do courts treat decisions and executions by doctors
differently? Perhaps judges can see that holding a doctor liable for a lapse in judgment
during an operation increases the burden of liability on a beneficial activity, whereas
judges have more difficulty seeing this fact when a doctor executes a medical procedure.
In general, we believe that the defense of second order reasonableness should be more
widely available when the underlying activities benefit others.

IV. Substitution
Having discussed positive externalities, we turn to another justification for having
a defense of second order reasonableness. Some activities and some forms of precaution
are more susceptible to lapses than others. A rule imposing liability for lapses creates an
incentive to switch to activities and forms of precaution that are less susceptible to lapses.
The switch creates a problem when the activities and forms of precaution that are less
susceptible to lapses are also more dangerous inherently.
To illustrate numerically, assume that performing an activity without any second
order precaution causes accidental harm of 500. Compare two forms of second order
precaution. Precaution A reduces accidental harm from 500 to 300. Assume that lapses
cause the harm of 300. The injurer who takes Precaution A is liable for 300 under a first
order negligence rule. The cost of Precaution A is 100. So the actor’s total private cost,
which equals the total sum of liability (300) plus precaution (100), is 400. The total social
cost, which equals the sum of accidental harm (300) plus precaution (100), is also 400.
Alternatively, compare these costs to second order Precaution B. Precaution B
reduces accidental harm from 500 to 350. Assume that nature, not lapses, causes the harm
of 350. The injurer who takes Precaution B is liable for 0 under a first order negligence
rule. The cost of Precaution B is 120. So the actor’s total private cost, which equals the
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sum of liability (0) plus precaution (120), equals 120. The total social cost, which equals
the sum of accidental harm (350) plus precaution (120), is 470.
With these numbers, Precaution A has lower social cost than Precaution B, and
precaution B has lower private costs for the injurer than Precaution A. Thus a first order
negligence rule gives the actor an incentive to substitute against A (the socially efficient
precaution) and in favor of B (the socially inefficient precaution).
Alternatively, allowing a defense of second order reasonableness should reverse
the incentives. Assume that taking Precaution A is reasonable, so the actor who chooses
Precaution A has a defense against liability.57 When the actor has a defense of second
order reasonableness, the actor’s private cost equals the cost of precaution. Precaution A
costs 100 and Precaution B costs 120, so the actor will choose Precaution A, which is
also socially efficient.58
The preceding examples concern two forms of precaution. Previous authors have
discussed incentives under "several dimensions of care". When two measures could be
taken to reduce the expected harm, the question is how to incentivize the injurer to take
the optimal combination of them. As Shavell (2004) indicated, under a negligence rule an
injurer would have a motive to choose optimal levels "only to those dimensions of care
that are incorporated in the due care standard… Some dimensions of care will usually be
omitted from the due care standard because of difficulties that courts would face in
ascertaining them… or in determining proper behavior in respect to them."59

The

substitution effect that we analyze in this paper is also a result of courts' failure to
incorporate an important dimension into the standard of care: the second order behavior
of the injurer.
The law should encourage the actor to use the forms of precaution that are
socially more efficient. To do so, liability law should encourage the forms of precaution
that are inherently less dangerous. Doing so sometimes requires liability law to allow a

57

Alternatively, a court could hold Precaution A is reasonable because it is socially efficient, and
Precaution B is unreasonable because it is socially inefficient. Equating “reasonable” with “efficient”
requires that courts have a lot of information on untaken precautions.
58
The other way to restore efficient incentives, which we do not discuss here, is to impose strict liability for
any harm resulting from the activity.
59
Shavell (1984), page 182.
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defense of second order reasonableness. In the preceding numerical example, such a
defense provides actors with an incentive to take reasonable precaution against lapsing,
instead of providing them with an incentive to take precautions that are less susceptible to
liability.
The substitution effect is not unique to lapses. Whenever liability law allows an
actor to externalize part of the costs and benefits of his actions, there is a risk that the law
will incentivize him to choose the more socially costly alternative.60 This paper has
shown that a defense of second order reasonableness should be available when it prevents
actors from switching to less effective forms of precaution. Next we discuss some
concrete examples.
A. Capital vs. Labor
Under the rule of first order negligence, the driver in Example 1 might aim for 65
mph, in which case he will be liable for accidents caused by his lapses in speed.
Alternatively, the driver might install cruise control, which presumably does not "lapse."
With cruise control, the driver’s liability for lapses in speed will be nil. The driver can set
the cruise control for 70 mph, which is the speed limit. Driving 70 mph with cruise
control will have lower liability costs for lapses than driving 65 without cruise control.
The former, however, may also result in more accidents than the latter. In general,
liability law should not encourage inherently more dangerous mechanical precautions,
even if they do not lapse.
Similarly, the following example illustrates that an organization can sometimes
reduce its liability for lapses by performing a task with a machine instead of a person,
even though the machine is more dangerous.
Example 3: Traffic Light and Policeman. The municipality must decide
60

Here are some causes of the substitution effect: First, sometimes one form of precaution is harder to
verify in court than another. Second, under a negligence rule, the extent of the unavoidable losses for which
the actor is not liable may differ for each form of precaution. Third, one choice sometimes creates positive
externalities that are higher than those created by the other choice. See Cooter & Porat (2006).
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whether to post a policeman in the intersection or to install a traffic light. A
policeman is more flexible than the traffic lights in directing traffic at the
intersection. However, a policeman may be more susceptible to lapses than
traffic lights are susceptible to defects. Assume that the social benefits of
flexibility exceed the cost of lapses.
First order negligence creates an incentive for the municipality to replace a
policeman with traffic lights. The reason for this could be that a machine does not lapse,
and, even if it lapses, a second order behavior defense may be possible. Thus, even if
traffic lights occasionally fail to operate properly, the municipality can argue in court that
it used the best available technology, so it was not at fault.
The choice between labor and capital, or manpower and machines, often occurs in
settings involving accidents. Employers must decide whether to reduce risks to
employees in the workplace by using safer machines or imposing safer work rules on
employees. Hospitals and other providers of medical services must decide whether to
monitor their patients' condition by sophisticated equipment or by their medical stuff.
Airport authorities and airlines must decide whether to promote passengers' safety by
new technologies or posting guards. Lastly, drivers must decide whether to rely on
devices like cruise controls or human skills. Technology is sometimes more effective
than manpower in avoiding accidents, and sometimes the opposite is true. Courts,
however, are more likely to find fault when humans lapse than when machines fail.
Unfortunately, this fact biases the choice between humans and machines.61
B. Susceptibility of Human Precautions to Lapses
A second form of substitution is between human precautions that are less
susceptible to lapses and human precautions that are more susceptible to lapses. The
following example illustrates such substitution.
Example 4: Deliveries of Babies. Doctors must decide between vaginal and
caesarian delivery of a baby. Assume courts cannot verify ex post whether the
doctor's decision was right or wrong, so no liability attaches to the doctor’s
61

Interesting, Grady argued that new technologies result in higher standards of liability, so tort liability
obstructs innovation and development. Our argument points out to an opposite influence. Grady (1988).
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decision to deliver by caesarian, even when the decision was bad. Courts,
however, can verify whether the doctor lapsed in executing the delivery, and
also whether that lapse caused the injury.62 Assume that doctors are more likely
to lapse in executing a vaginal delivery than in executing a caesarian delivery.
Also assume that caesarian delivery is inherently more dangerous in the long
run than vaginal delivery.
In Example 4, the prevailing negligence rule gives doctors an incentive to
perform too many caesarian deliveries.63 To illustrate numerically, assume that vaginal
delivery harms the mother 1% of the time, and a lapse by the doctor is the cause in 75%
of these cases. Thus vaginal delivery results in doctor’s liability to the injured mother in
0.75% of cases. In contrast, assume that caesarian delivery harms the mother 2% of the
time and a lapse by the doctor is the cause in 25% of these cases. Thus caesarian birth
results in doctor’s liability to the injured mother in 0.50% of cases.64 According to these
numbers, a first order negligence rules makes the accident risk for mothers twice as great
from caesarian birth as from vaginal birth, whereas the liability risk for doctors is half as
great from caesarian birth as from vaginal birth.65
A first order negligence rule creates a bias towards precautions that are less
susceptible to lapses. For example, an organization that imposes strict rules on employees
who engage in risky activities may reduce its liability by reducing the frequency of lapses
by its employees. However, the elimination of employee’s discretion may increase the
62

The distortions caused by tort law with respect to caesarian and vaginal birth are extensively analyzed by
this paper’s authors in Cooter & Porat (2006). According to a report of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, one of the explanations for the increasing use of cesarean section in the United States
concerns malpractice liability: "[i]n 1976, almost all questionnaires returned from 50 representative medical
school department chairpersons, other professors, and obstetricians, mentioned malpractice suits as a factor
in increased cesarean section rates." The report quotes Marieskind, who interviewed 100 physicians, and
concluded that the threat of malpractice suits was the chief causal factor in the increased use of cesarean
section. See also "Caesarean section on the rise", the Lancet November 18th 2000 ( "[f]rom a defensive
medicine perspective, US obstetricians seem to be viewing caesarean section as a safe option since the rate
of caesarean section in that country, now 22% has nearly quadrupled over the past 20 years.")
63
We assume that doctors cannot adjust their prices to account perfectly for the different liability risks of
liability posed by each procedure.
64
For simplicity, we implicitly assume that the average harm from vaginal and caesarian deliveries is the
same.
65
In general, doctors are advised by risk management experts to choose procedures that reduce their
liability potential, when the enhanced risk is not captured by prices. See Fenton & Marcinko (2005):
"[Physicians] should evaluate their own practice and identify those procedures and those patient types that
carry a high risk of malpractice for which the physician is not adequately reimbursed. Physicians then
should tailor their practice so that they no longer provide those services. The revenue lost will be worth the
risk of the malpractice suit and the collateral consequences". Id. 133.
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total risk to the public. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 5. Regulation vs. Discretion. The police department considers how
to regulate policemen in various circumstances. One alternative is to regulate
policemen's behavior by a comprehensive set of specific rules. The police can
apply these rules mechanically with few lapses. However, comprehensive rules
make the police inflexible. Second, the police department can provide police
with general principles. The application of general principles often results in
lapses in judgment. However, general principles make the police more flexible
and effective. Assume that cost of lapses under general principles is lower than
inflexibility cost under comprehensive set of specific rules.
What will the police department do under the prevailing rule of negligence? It may wish
to decrease its liability risks at the cost of decreasing its effectiveness.
C. Execution vs. Judgment
A third form of substitution is between judgments and executions. In some fields
discussed in Part I of the paper, liability attaches to faulty execution more than to faulty
judgment. In these circumstances, actors have an incentive to choose the precautions least
susceptible to lapses in execution and more susceptible to lapses in judgment, even when
the latter are less efficient than the former. Example 6 illustrates such a case.
Example 6. Treating Cancer. Hospital X must adopt procedure A or
procedure B for treating a type of cancer. Procedure A involves more execution
than judgment, and procedure B involves more judgment than execution. The
choice between the procedures will not be considered negligence, because
courts are unwilling to "second guess" the hospital's decision. However, lapses
in execution will be considered negligence.
Courts, it seems, are less willing to impose liability for a lapse in judgment than
for a lapse in execution.66 If the hospital cannot perfectly adjust prices for each procedure
to reflect liability risks, a first order negligence rule may cause the hospital to prefer
procedure B. Procedure B may lower liability costs, even though it may raise accident
costs.

66

Supra.
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V. Implementing Second Order Defenses
Now we turn to problems of implementing a defense of second order
reasonableness against liability for lapses. It is hard to prove that the driver’s selfmonitoring in Example 1 was reasonable or unreasonable, or that the doctor in Example 2
made reasonable or unreasonable preparation for the operation, or the policeman who
lapsed in directing traffic in Example 3 does so less or more often than a reasonable
policeman. To answer such questions, the trier of facts should have information about the
actors' lapses over a period of time, or alternatively, about the efforts he actually took at
an earlier stage to decrease the probability or magnitude of his lapses.
Given the difficulty of proof, allocating its burden crucially affects the
implementation of a second order negligence rule. Defendants can usually collect
information with respect to their second order behavior better than plaintiffs. We
explained that placing the burden of proof on the defendant—thus allowing a second
reasonable defense—is more efficient than other alternatives. In particular a second order
reasonableness defense provides incentives for potential injurers to satisfy the standard of
second order precaution and to make this fact observable to courts. Thus cautious drivers
may install recording devices to prove that they seldom speed, doctors may document
preparations for an operation, and police departments may track accidents by officers.
Unreasonable second order behavior increases the probability of lapsing, which is
less than causing it. What should the court do when second order negligence increases
the probability of lapsing by less than 100%, which is most of the time? A court might
feel compelled by the causation doctrine to find “no liability.” In that case, the court
gives injurers no incentive to take precautions that decrease the probability of accidents.
At the opposite pole, the court might presume that the defendant caused an accident
whenever his second order unreasonableness increased its probability. This solution is a
practical one and relatively easy to implement
We can imagine intermediate rules in between these polar types. First, a principle
of probabilistic recovery can apply to lapses. Under this solution, a driver whose second
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order negligence increased the probability of lapsing from 3% to 4%, would compensate
the victim for 25% of her harm.67 Probabilistic recovery raises many issues that we
cannot discuss here.68
Alternatively, a rule of liability for excessive harm can be applied for repeat
harms. Assume that an actor caused n units of harm over a certain period of time, while
only m units of harm would have been produced if the actor had behaved reasonably.
Thus “n” might refer to the actual annual harm in a hospital, and “m” might refer to the
annual harm that reasonable precaution would have caused. By the rule of liability for
excessive harm, which we developed elsewhere,69 the hospital is liable for the excessive
harm, which is n-m. Applying this rule requires information on aggregate harm, both
actual n and ideal m. However, applying this rule does not require information on
individual harms. Avoiding proof on a case-by-case basis greatly reduces the information
requirements for liability law.70
We have explained that a second order negligence rule can reduces incentives for
excessive care by reducing uncertainty about liability. To completely eliminate
uncertainty about liability, the injurer must make his second order precaution x2
observable to the courts, and the courts or other officials must make the legal standard
x2* observable to the injurer. (The second order reasonableness defense raises some
other issues that we leave for future research.71)

67

In 1 out of 4 cases the lapse was caused by the second order negligence. The probability that the lapse in
question is the one caused by the second order negligence is therefore 1/4.
68
Porat & Stein (2001), at 101-29.
69
Cooter & Porat (2007).
70
Notice that the optimal units of harm m are the amount resulting from a reasonable level of second order
precaution. So liability for excessive harm can be viewed a variant of the rule of second order negligence.
71
Here are two. The first issue relates to the alternatives of reducing risks: should a defendant who failed
to take reasonable second order precautions be allowed to show that he took at an earlier stage second order
precautions beyond the ones required by reasonableness, and in general reduced risks significantly? To
illustrate, should a driver who lapsed and caused an accident be allowed to raise the argument that he
installed in his car expensive safety devices which he was not obliged to install, thereby reducing risks
dramatically, although given the existence of the devices his second order behavior was unreasonable?
The second issue relates to third parties' second order behavior: Should a doctor who lapsed due to fatigue
and caused injury be allowed to show that the hospital required him to work too many extra hours? If such
a defense is allowed for the doctor, it will be essential to impose liability on the hospital, conditioned upon
establishing its negligence. Cf. Mello & Studdert (2008), who argue that instead on focusing on individual
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Conclusion

Lapses cause a high proportion of accidents, but they are under-theorized in
liability law. To model lapses, we assume that actors do not choose an exact level of
precaution. Instead, we assume that actors draw precaution from a probability
distribution. We call the result of this draw “first order precaution” because it determines
the probability of an accident. A lapse is a draw from the distribution’s lower tail. The
prevailing tort rule is liability for harm caused by a lapse that falls below the standard of
reasonable care.
“Second order precaution” refers to behavior that shifts the probability
distribution for first order precaution. This shift decreases the probability of lapsing,
which decreases the probability of an accident. Thus first order precaution directly
reduces the probability of an accident, whereas second order precaution indirectly
reduces the probability of an accident. Preparation and self-monitoring are two general
forms of second order behavior.
Under the prevailing tort rule, an actor is usually liable for the harm caused by a
lapse, regardless of how much precaution he takes to avoid lapsing. However, liability
law sometimes permits a defense of second order reasonableness. Courts are reluctant to
second-guess decisions made in emergencies or judgments by experts who balance
various considerations. In these cases, an actor can often escape liability for a defective
judgment by showing that he took reasonable preparations to make it. Consequently,
courts more often allow a defense of second order reasonableness for a lapse in judgment
than for a lapse in skill when executing a decision.
The prevailing tort rule makes sense most of the time because courts usually
doctors' negligence, tort law should focus on institutions, and impose enterprise liability; and that systemic
errors are major causes for most medical accidents even if typically combined with individual errors. The
authors also suggest that "most promising opportunities for injury prevention lie at the organizational
level", id 601, and that "system factors may underlie many physician errors in the sense that they create
conditions in which human error is likely to occur and to go unnoticed until injury results." Id. 609. An
analogous question relates to gatekeeper's liability: under what conditions it is desirable to impose liability
on gatekeepers in addition, or instead of, the direct cause of the injury. This general question is beyond the
scope of this paper. See Lichtman & Posner (2006) (arguing for imposing liability on Internet Services
Providers).
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cannot verify the reasonableness of second order behavior. The prevailing tort rule,
however, provides incentives for inefficient care. It also burdens activities whose positive
externalities benefit others, such as practicing medicine or volunteering to help others.
We advocate encouraging activities with positive externalities, and improving levels of
care, by extending the defense of second order reasonableness to them. We also advocate
allowing this defense when it prevents actors from substituting worse forms of precaution
for better ones, as sometimes happens when machines substitute for people, or when
activities requiring risky judgments substitute for activities requiring risky execution. The
defendant should bear the burden of proving that his second order behavior was
reasonable, rather than the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving that the defendant’s
second order behavior was unreasonable. The burden of proof should fall on the
defendant because he is better situated than the plaintiff to provide evidence on his
second order behavior.
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